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Abstract
As the recent global economic crisis has shown, we cannot leave
the search for solutions exclusively to politicians and the so-called ex-
perts in finance and economics. It has become apparent that the usual
economic focus on continued growth and short-term profitability is not
sustainable and needs to be readjusted. This paper proposes that the moral
resources of religions are a precious heritage of humanity in its search for
meaning and the good life. This wisdom should not be restricted to the
faithful but be made available to secular society as well.  For the Christian
churches, this seems to require firstly taking stock of their social and
moral teachings and secondly translating them into a language that is
comprehensible to believers and non-believers alike and that can inspire
the moral discourse in pluralist society.
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Let’s imagine two ships of identical structure are going to sail
from Cape Town to Shanghai and you must decide on which ship you will
travel. You learn that the loading officer of ship “A” will be on board for
the full journey and will get his bonus only on the ship’s safe arrival. The
loading officer on ship “B”, however, will be paid in proportion to the
quantity of the goods carried and he will neither be required to sail on the
ship nor will his payments be affected should the cargo (or even the ship
itself) be lost. __ On which ship would you like to sail?
If you think that this story has something to do with the current
economic and financial crisis, you are not mistaken. Obviously, the crisis
is not only about money or the stability of the banking system but also and
more importantly about values and ethics. It is about the erosion of trust
in financial institutions, the lack of confidence in the economic system as
a whole, and the reassessment of the moral foundations for prosperity in
societies across the world.
In a crisis that directly affects the whole family of nations we
cannot leave the search for solutions exclusively to politicians and the so-
called experts in finance and economics, particularly since the latter failed
to notice that something was about to go spectacularly wrong and to
sound the alarm bells before it was too late. Instead, the crisis calls for an
overhaul of the finance system and a thorough reform of the world
economy that would also include strategies for effectively confronting
environmental degradation, global warming, and the rapid depletion of
non-renewable resources by accepting responsibility for future genera-
tions. It has become apparent that the usual economic focus on continued
growth and short-term profitability is not sustainable and needs to be
readjusted.
As the moral resources of religions are a precious heritage of
humanity in its search for meaning and the good life they should not be
restricted to the faithful but be made available to secular society as well.
For the Christian churches, this seems to require firstly taking stock of
their social and moral teachings and secondly translating them into a lan-
guage that is comprehensible to believers and non-believers alike and that
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can inspire the moral discourse in pluralist society. A brief analysis of the
main causes of the current crisis may serve as the starting point of our
deliberations as it helps us to more clearly identify the precarious as-
sumptions of the dominant economic system that need to be reassessed.
1. Systemic Shortcomings in Libertarian Economy
We may recall that the financial crisis revealed shortcomings on
all three levels of operations in the complex economic system that has
penetrated all sectors of human life. While some of the shortcomings are
of a technical and scientific nature, the more important ones are systemic
and directly related to the moral foundations of the modern economy and
its assumptions about homo oeconomicus.
At the micro-level, the focus is on the individual actors, their moral
choices and their moral dispositions. Several studies have confirmed that
the financial crisis has one of its major causes in instruments of remunera-
tion for top executives that linked salaries to short-term increases in com-
pany value and encouraged risky or even irresponsible business opera-
tions through attractive incentive payments and share options. It was the
carrot-approach without the stick, which fuelled greed, ignored account-
ability, contributed to a lack of transparency, favoured incompetence and
the neglect of due care in the invention of ever more sophisticated finan-
cial products whose inherent risks were not fully understood. In the eyes
of many observers, the crisis has exposed selfishness, collective greed
and the hoarding of goods on a mammoth scale.
Yet the extent of moral space for responsible decision-making
may vary individually as business executives, managers, and investment
bankers act within larger environments of market transactions at the in-
terface between business and society. The charge of greed levelled against
individuals must therefore be placed within the wider context of estab-
lished business operations, common industry standards, and the social
interaction of people who are moral equals.
This leads to the second, the meso-level of business activity, which
largely defines the moral space of individual actors in coordination with
professional standards, policy regulations, and consumers demanding or
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rejecting products in expectation of profit and the satisfaction of needs. It
is at this level that economic transactions and their rules closely corre-
spond to the demands of society at large and are directly influenced by
ethical values, policy decisions, and consumer behaviour. This implies a
moral responsibility both on the parts of governments and regulators and
of consumers for the kind of products they request; it also provides the
general public some leverage on the rules and codes of conduct that de-
fine good practice in firms, corporations, and business organisations. In
this regard, moral shortcomings in business are to some extent prompted
by regulatory shortcomings that in turn favour short-sighted consumer
behaviour and reflect flaws in the economic system.
With regard to the finance industry, banks are supposed to have
the twin core functions of providing efficient payment mechanisms and of
assessing and managing risks of their products. If __ as Joseph Stiglitz has
argued __ financial markets “created risk, misallocated capital, and en-
couraged excessive indebtedness while imposing high transaction costs”,
this had as much to do with the motivations of individual actors as with
deregulation policies (since the 1970s) that gradually revoked the strict
separation of commercial and investment banking and resulted in the pro-
vision of cheap credit.1  The rapid growth of credit instruments world-
wide since the 1990s has long surpassed the accumulation of wealth in
the economy and generated enormous debts that in fact have been ex-
ported to developing countries and to future generations.2
Managers in finance could rightly claim they were merely respond-
ing to the consumer spending boom from 2002 to 2007 those policies had
initiated; but they could not be blamed for the resulting domestic and
international imbalances or for financial innovations that merely executed
government policies by making credit cheaper and more widely available.
They seem, however, to have traded good merchant-standards that would
have required them to ensure clients’ credit payment capacity for short-
term profit and the promise of bonus payments.
The attitude of the former chairman of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd
Blankfein, seems typical of the abysmal failures and moral shortcomings
at both the micro- and the meso-levels. Testifying before a sub-commit-
tee of the US Congress in April 2010 he was reported to have rejected
any moral or legal obligations on the part of Goldman Sachs to inform its
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clients about the quality of its products and if they were in their best
interest. Blankfein argued that since Goldman Sachs was not acting in a
fiduciary role, the firm was not obligated to inform the clients that it was
selling products that according to its own assessment, would soon be
worthless and on whose depreciation it was betting.3
The main focus at the third, the macro-level of business activity,
is on the defining conditions of the economic system as a whole and its
moral and social legitimacy. It is also the most significant but certainly
not the only entry point for competing religious views on the good soci-
ety and a life worth living. In the current crisis it is at this macro-level
where the leading assumptions of the neo-liberal system of free market
economy and capitalism are being assessed together with the system’s
ability to properly serve human needs and the common good.
The failures and shortcomings at the previous levels are clearly
tied to the defining conditions at the macro-level. In particular, we should
take note of three presuppositions of the dominant model of capitalist
free market economy.
Firstly, from the neo-liberal perspective markets operate on the
anthropological assumptions of human beings as rational, self-interested,
and independent agents, who act on utility maximization strategies that
exclude emotions as well as goals external to their well-defined self-inter-
est. As Amartya Sen noted, the “assumption of the completely egoistic
human being has come to dominate much of mainstream economic
theory”.4  This construct of the homo oeconomicus favours the develop-
ment of mathematical models for the calculation of consumer behaviour
that tend to ignore irrational factors and to disregard social costs as neg-
ligible anomalities in an otherwise self-contained system of rational utility
maximisation.
Secondly, the economy is perceived as the totality of processes
that follow their own laws and must therefore be kept as free as possible
from any interference in their operations.  In particular, the role of gov-
ernment is restricted to the absolute minimum and only charged with en-
suring fundamental property rights and the highest possible degree of
individual liberty. “The implicit view behind standard equilibrium models
is that markets and economies are inherently stable and that they only
temporarily get off track”.5  According to Friedrich August von Hayek,
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one of the leading minds of neo-liberal economics, markets operate on
principles that __ like the laws of nature __ can be discovered by human
ingenuity but cannot be influenced, let alone be changed. It is therefore an
“illusion” and simply “nonsense” to expect that markets care about social
justice; only the “economically illiterate” may still want to impose social
and moral obligations on capital and the market laws of maximizing profit.6
Thirdly, within such system ethics will be largely reduced to a
supportive role that is charged with interpreting conflicts of interests among
market participants merely as coordination problems in devising strate-
gies for the best pursuit of enlightened self-interest with minimal costs.
On these premises the characterization of self-interested utility maximi-
zation in terms of greed would illicitly introduce external moral expecta-
tions into markets and hold economic transactions accountable to ethical
standards that are inherently alien to business. Economic activity and fi-
nance, the argument goes, are defined by the logic of rational markets
that alone are sufficient to achieve economic equilibrium. Therefore indi-
vidual actors in the finance industry or elsewhere must not be blamed for
simply following the rules of their trade and for doing what they did.
Except for a few cases of deception and fraud that were brought before
the courts, what to outsiders may look like improper behaviour moti-
vated by greed and recklessness was in fact standard practice of their
profession and within the legal parameters of the finance industry.
It is one of the most remarkable results of the crisis that the domi-
nant model of neo-liberal economics has come under scrutiny and flaws
were revealed in its leading assumptions. It is no longer only a weary
public whose outrage about the tremendous cost of the crisis economists
could continue to ignore as economic “illiteracy”. In the meantime, quite
a few economists have expressed doubts about the viability of their
favoured model and called for the reassessment of its underlying con-
struct of homo oeconomicus. Instead of reducing “economics to the study
of optimal decisions in well-specified choice problems”, it would be nec-
essary to acknowledge that human subjects act in ways that bear “no
resemblance to the rational expectations paradigm”, since they are strongly
influenced by emotional reactions, interactions, and connections between
various actors, as well as differences in information, knowledge and ca-
pabilities.7  As Oscar Wilde once remarked, “Man is a rational animal who
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always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with
the dictates of reason”.8
Since human beings are no rational atoms in a social void, they
are not merely functions in the economic system either. Instead they are
immersed in rich social life-worlds that allow for multiple roles and com-
prehensive conceptions of the good. Recent empirical research has con-
firmed that market participants act within social frameworks and back-
ground institutions that suggest many possible economic models, not just
one. “Social preference models” point to traders who only care about
their own monetary payoff while others “may additionally be concerned
with the social impact of their behaviour. Reciprocity models conjecture
that people tend to be kind in response to kindness and unkind in re-
sponse to unkindness, while fairness models posit that some individuals
may have a preference for equitably sharing the efficiency gains from
trade”.9  Strong feelings of injustice have been identified as prime motiva-
tions in decision-making that includes economic transactions. Instead of
being an independent system with its own rules, the economy is “rather a
subsystem embedded in other systems” on which it relies for its exist-
ence.10  As Robert Solomon has pointed out, “business is not just busi-
ness. It is not self-contained, with its own rational, its own rules, its own
reason for being. It is, essentially, a part of human life and human commu-
nity”.11  The claim of the amorality of business should therefore be dis-
carded as a myth.12
As the crisis gained momentum, even politicians that were once
staunch defenders of unfettered markets could no longer ignore the sys-
temic flaws of neo-liberal economics. In the Statement adopted by the
G20 leaders at their meeting in Pittsburgh in 2009 they agreed that the
economic crisis ushers in “a new era of sustainable global economic ac-
tivity grounded in responsibility”. They called for the reform of “the glo-
bal architecture” that would “meet the needs of the 21st century” and
proposed “to launch a framework that lays out the policies and the way
we act together to generate strong, sustainable and balanced global
growth” (no. 14). Unfortunately, these words have not yet been followed
by decisive actions. The longer the crisis lingers on and the more coun-
tries in the world are affected, the stronger is the need to unite people in
the common task of working out the framework of an economic system
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that is built on the principles of justice and sustainability. In this effort, the
world’s religions cannot stand aside but must make their spiritual resources
available to secular society in a moral discourse accessible to all.
2. Religion and Morality in Secular Society
Characteristic of secular society in the West are two closely inter-
related features: A wide diversity of religious and non-religious views and
a set of moral values upon which democratic states are built that is inde-
pendent of such views and not grounded in their onto-theological pre-
mises. These values include liberty, equality, human rights, and the rule of
law. Ideally, democratic societies are built upon a political ethic that (in
Rawls’ terminology) is shared by people of different “comprehensive views
of the good” in some kind of “overlapping consensus”. It is therefore a
fundamental requirement of secular society that the response of the demo-
cratic state to value pluralism must not favour any one world-view in
particular and at the expense of others. In this regard “the maintenance of
neutrality in public institutions” has become “an essential entailment of
equality between all basic beliefs”.13  According to Charles Taylor, the
strong normative view attached to secular society enshrines the three
basic principles of (1) the rights and liberties of its members, (2) the equality
among them, and (3) the principle that rule is based on consent. In other
words: human rights, equality and non-discrimination, and democracy
are typical features of secular society.
The question clearly is whether such an overlapping consensus is
possible without a religious underpinning, or to what extent religious
worldviews can share their fundamental moral intuitions in a language
that is accessible also to non-religious members of society. While the his-
torical connotations of secularism point towards hostility against religion
and the cleansing of the political square from any remnants of religious
claims on political life, contemporary democratic societies have come to
recognize their shaky normative foundations and the need to look for
ways of engaging religions in their attempt to secure their basic prin-
ciples.
We may recall that this was the main topic of the memorable de-
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bate between Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, at the time prefect of the Con-
gregation of the Doctrine of Faith, and J?rgen Habermas, one of the lead-
ing Western political philosophers.14  By exploring possible pre-political
moral foundations of the liberal, democratic state, the question quickly
shifted to the authority, scope, and possible limits of secular reason that
originated in ancient Greek philosophy and established itself as the domi-
nant force of modernity in the West. Its particular form of rationality,
which found its most important expression in modern economics, sci-
ence, and technology as well as in the liberal, democratic, and constitu-
tional state, was not only credited with the mind’s liberation from Church
tutelage, but was also thought to have no equal and thus to naturally
extend its reign to non-Western cultures and, finally, throughout the world.
The triumph of science and technology was supposed to be also the tri-
umph of secular reason.
Yet reason revealed a dialectic that caused doubts about its ability
to ground morality exclusively on its own premises. Nuclear power equally
illustrates reason’s capacity for harnessing nature’s potential for the ben-
efit of mankind and for utterly destructive purposes. The scientific explo-
ration of nature inaugurated extrordinary improvements in the living con-
ditions of humanity but also led to the exploitation of natural resources
that turned nature (and increasingly even human nature) into a commod-
ity. Apparently, unfettered reason can go astray and be instrumentalized
for inhumane purposes. As David Hume noted, it is “not contrary to rea-
son to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my
finger”15 (Treatise, 416).
Modernity, however, has a more complex genealogy than the secu-
larist ideology is ready to accept. For open-minded observers like
Habermas it is clear that “the normative self-understanding of moder-
nity” cannot be explained without due recognition of its roots in the Judaeo-
Christian moral tradition. In this regard, “Christianity has functioned as
more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism,
from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity,
the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality
of conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct legacy of the
Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love”.16  Christian values
have penetrated even the moral fabrics of secular society in a process that
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seems foreshadowed in the parable S. Matthew (13:33) reports about the
leaven that leavens the whole lump of bread without discernible traces
(see also 1 Cor 5:6). Apparently, concepts like “morality and ethical life,
person, individuality, or freedom and emancipation” cannot be fully un-
derstood “without appropriating the substance of the Judeo-Christian un-
derstanding of history in terms of salvation.17
In the emancipation of secular ethics from these roots, something
was lost and its absence is painfully felt even in secular society. This may
also explain, at least partially, the re-emergence of religion in many places
in the West, e.g. the transformation of sin into guilt cannot substitute for
the substantive religious meaning that was once evoked by the term. The
recognition of sin implies a longing for forgiveness that is accompanied
by the unsentimental wish that suffering caused to others may be made
undone. No form of secular remembrance of the victims can substitute
for the religious hope that past suffering of the just was not in vain. Yet in
a post-metaphysical age, even the lost hope in salvation and resurrection
leaves a tangible emptiness, when secular modernity is confronted with
the irreversibility of past suffering and with the injustice of abusing, deni-
grating, and murdering the innocent. As the magnitude of such suffering
exceeds any secular, humanly possible forms of restitution and compen-
sation, it raises questions about modern morality’s own foundations and
about the significance of the spiritual dimension of human existence for
the grounding of ethics.18
It is remarkable that Pope Benedict XVI in his encyclical Spe
Salvi explicitly draws on the dialectic of reason and its implications for
establishing a just world on the premises of post-metaphysical seculariza-
tion. In particular, he credits Horkheimer and Adorno, “the great thinkers
of the Frankfurt School”, with working out the “negative” dialectic of
reason that exposed the inherent weakness of their own Marxist tradition
while upholding its vision of salvation in a secular “kingdom of God”.
They acknowledged that true justice would imply a world “where not
only present suffering would be wiped out, but also that which is irrevo-
cably past would be undone” (no. 42).19  Since for Adorno this is no
longer an option, the cries of the oppressed and the injustice they suffer
reveal an empty space in the centre of the secular world that no substitute
can fill. In the eyes of the Pope, Marx’s vision is therefore deeply flawed,
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since it ignored the ambiguity of freedom, which “always remains also
freedom for evil” (no. 21).
Similar concerns, albeit on a lesser scale, apply to the moral re-
pugnance about attempts to justify greed as an amoral, dispositional re-
quirement of market participants. The near universal condemnation of
such attempts would be misunderstood if it were construed as nothing
but resentment and envy of the market losers and not as genuine protest
against the persuasive language of economics that has begun to dissolve
moral feelings of compassion and sympathy into the terminology of profit
maximization. Greed, we may recall, stands in the genealogy of moral
vices that receive their full profile only from religious connotations. Since
this context has been lost and is no longer available in secular society, it
has become increasingly difficult to define its moral impropriety. Conse-
quently its definition oscillates between vice and virtue, or between its
characterization as a major cause of the economic crisis and as a genuine
motivational force of economic activity. The continued rejection of greed
by the general public should therefore be taken as pointing beyond eco-
nomic theory and reflecting a spiritual loss for which secular morality has
no substitute.
This leaves us in a precarious position, since we can neither ex-
pect to exclusively establish modern ethics on Christian foundations nor
on the premises of secular reason. It may account for the fact that neither
Christianity nor secular reason succeeded in their advances towards the
cultures outside their perimeters. Particularly the cultures of Islam, Bud-
dhism, and Hinduism as well as tribal cultures of Africa continue to reject
the normative foundations of both Christianity and secular rationality. Yet
they seem to experience within their societies similar tensions between
traditional moralities grounded in particular religious traditions and the
appeal of universal reason.20
A way forward may be to invite all interested parties to explore a
common ethical ground from which principles could be drawn to which
all could consent, albeit from different positions. Although this will turn
out more difficult than it sounds, for a start it could take up Rawls’ con-
cept of an “overlapping consensus”21 as well as K?ng’s idea of a global
ethic22 and investigate further the ethical commonalities any society will
need for peaceful cooperation. Such search through interreligious dia-
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logue has been officially endorsed by the II. Vatican Council; Pope Benedict
XVI has recently extended it beyond the realm of religions. In his encyc-
lical Caritas in Veritate, the Pope regards it a “duty of believers to unite
their efforts with those of all men and women of good will, with the
followers of other religions and with non-believers, so that this world of
ours may effectively correspond to the divine plan: living as a family un-
der the Creator’s watchful eye” (no. 57).
While this requires the translation of fundamental religious con-
cepts into a language that is comprehensible also to non-believers, it would
be neither fair nor necessary to demand of politically engaged religious
citizens that they suppress their personal religious convictions in favour
of exclusively “secular reasons”. Such demand would ignore the integral
role religion plays in the life of persons of faith. It is therefore a matter of
fairness that the liberal, democratic state should not place a greater bur-
den on the shoulders of religious citizens by demanding of them to ignore
their religious world views. Instead both sides ought to be open-minded
and sensitive to each others’ value perceptions. Whereas religious citi-
zens may make public contributions in their own religious language pro-
vided that these are presented so that secular citizens can grasp their
meaning, secular citizens must not close their minds to the possible truth
content of such presentations but enter into dialogues from which reli-
gious reasons might then be transformed into generally accessible argu-
ments.23  Though this is for Christians a momentous task, it is not entirely
new. Over sixty years ago, Dietrich Bonhoeffer already envisioned it, and
in even more extreme circumstances than those we witness today. In his
letter from prison, written on 16 July 1944 in the face of execution at the
hands of the Nazi-regime, he wondered if a “non-religious interpretation
of Biblical concepts” was possible so that genuine Christian concepts
could still be understood by people in a secular age.24  This task is cer-
tainly worthy of being pursued further.
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3. Christian Moral Resources for an Economy in Crisis
a) Human Dignity
The most prominent candidate for a Christian conception that can
be a significant resource for the re-assessment of the foundations of con-
temporary ethics is human dignity. Although as a principle of morality it is
rooted in the Christian theology of creation and in Christology, it was
also constitutive for the construction of modern moral identity in the West
and the conception of human rights.25
Theologically, human dignity signifies an ontological quality of
human beings that makes them morally considerable. As children of God
created in His image all human beings are of intrinsic worth and therefore
owe respect to each other. Whereas according to the neo-platonic tradi-
tion dignity was a general predicate of all being, it was now reserved for
the human person as the individual whose specific mode of existence is
moral (esse morale) and thus distinct from the natural or rational modes
of other beings. Its intrinsic worth is christologically grounded in the “in-
finite dignity” of the humanity of Christ that alone can confer infinite
value in a finite world.26
The modern origin of the ethics of dignity and respect lies in Kant’s
moral philosophy. Kant was aware not only of the Christian genealogy
but also of its amalgamation with common morality that was Christian in
nature as it had integrated fundamental conceptions of the Judaic-Chris-
tian tradition. In this sense, Kant’s moral philosophy is both the recon-
struction of common morality and the successful translation of a funda-
mental Christian concept into the language of public reason. As Alan
Donagan observed, “morality, as Kant presents it, is traditional Christian
morality demystified and universalized. It does not presuppose the truth
of the Christian faith, but is presupposed by it”.27  This morality is based
on one fundamental principle, the principle that obligates everyone to
treat humanity always as an end and never as a means only. Its popular
precursors are the Golden Rule of the gospel and the so-called Silver
Rule of Confucianism but its philosophical expression is the categorical
imperative. In short, the principle of human dignity encapsulates an un-
derstanding of human beings as qualitatively different from anything else,
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since their worth is without equivalent and therefore “beyond price”. The
dignity of such beings commands unconditional respect (Achtung).
Human dignity draws its moral force from a particular vision of
humanity that insists on the priority of reciprocal respect over humilia-
tion, force, and violence. What we owe to each other is grounded in what
we fundamentally are: fragile and vulnerable beings with human face. As
Emmanuel Levinas reminds us, by looking at the naked face of the other
(autrui) we enter into moral space. In such encounter, the other is ex-
posed to me in the irreducible existence of his or her defenceless eyes.
Although the other as corporeal reality is an object among objects, the
open face looking at me signals a fundamental difference to all objects as
it puts up an invisible moral barrier against intrusion. It opens a relation
“with something absolutely other: the resistance of what has no resis-
tance __ the ethical resistance”.28  It is this moral barrier that is central to
the idea of human dignity and defines a person’s moral standing. Human
dignity is both empowerment and constraint29 and it would be miscon-
strued if it were conceptualized exclusively as a principle to safeguard
individual rights but not also as the principle of responsibility and respect
for all other human beings.
b) Personhood
The Christian tradition sees the difference between humans and
the rest of creation in humanity’s being created in God’s own image and
likeness (Gen 1:26-27). Christianity thus affirms a holistic understanding
of the person that is irreducible to cognitive characteristics that only con-
tingently apply to human embodiment. What makes human beings differ-
ent and worthy of respect is that they are beings of freedom: they are
called to freely choose the good and the just. As genuinely moral beings
their freedom is not simply an empirical characteristic among others, but
their specific form of existence. As empirical beings, they share their ani-
mal nature with all other creatures and are like them subjected to the
constraints of nature. Yet there is a divine ‘spark’ (Meister Eckhart) in
them (soul) that testifies to their divine nature and resists naturalistic or
materialistic reduction. That makes them peculiar beings of two worlds,
the world of nature and the world of spirit and mind.30  Personhood is
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neither something they are accorded by others and that they can subse-
quently lose, nor can it be dualistically separated from its embodiment.
Instead it is what designates the specific form in which only humans exist
as biological beings.
Before we blame this view for the environmental destruction we
are now experiencing everywhere, we should take note that from a Chris-
tian perspective the special place humans hold in nature does not entail
absolute possession of nature but rather stewardship in responsibility to
the Creator. As Robin Attfield has pointed out against Lynn White’s charges
that “Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indiffer-
ence to the feelings of natural objects”, the tradition of stewardship runs
through the whole Bible and Christian theology.31  Typical is S. Augustine’s
rejection of the view that everything is made for human pleasure, needs,
and satisfaction and his claim that non-human creatures glorify the Cre-
ator “with respect to their own nature”. Although there is an “ineliminable
human perspective”32 in our relationship with nature and non-human crea-
tures, the ethics of respect excludes narrow anthropocentrism that would
recognize true value only and exclusively in human beings.
c) Spiritual Humanity
The prevailing naturalistic worldview in the West leaves space
neither for ethics nor for religion or metaphysics, but regards the world as
a closed system of which only the hard sciences can offer an adequate
description that meets their methodological criteria of empirical objectiv-
ity. From this perspective, human beings are essentially biological sys-
tems of self-preservation whose differentiation from other such systems
can be explained by the laws of evolution.
This naturalistic world-view has become the fertile ground for the
construction of scientific models of human agency that include homo
oeconomicus. It devalues fundamental intuitions of religion and ethics
and with them our search for meaning and purpose. Historically, this world-
view can be traced back to a peculiar ambiguity of the scientific paradigm
itself as it first emerged in classical Greek philosophy. According to Plato's
famous statement, philosophical inquiry originated in a sense of wonder.
Wonderment is simultaneously the acknowledgment of ignorance and the
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awareness of the mystery of being that no explanation can ever exhaust.
Typologically, the classical attitudes towards the existential experience of
wonder are exemplified in Plato and Aristotle: while the latter takes it as
the starting point for scientific curiosity that aims at finally substituting
knowledge for ignorance, for the former it marks the ultimate limit of any
rational inquiry beyond which one can only speculate in images and myths.
The alternative is not between the rational and the irrational, but between
respecting the finitude of human nature and the limits of reason or __ with
Protagoras __ regarding man as the measure of all things. Ultimately, it
raises the question of how we want to understand ourselves and from
where we draw meaning.
Questions about meaning and purpose arise particularly and most
disturbingly when we are confronted with disease, suffering, and death.
Christianity places theses questions within comprehensive narratives that
open a spiritual dimension to human existence that neither science nor
economic theory can accommodate. Accordingly, the meaning of life tran-
scends bodily existence, but is inseparable from it. For embodied beings
of freedom, the drama of human frailty and finitude is as much the drama
of the human body as it is the drama of the spirit. While suffering remains,
its meaning is transformed, and seemingly senseless death is integrated
into the experience of faith that culminates in love of God and other. To
God they entrust their lives with all its joy and pain, for the needy and
suffering they care through works of charity.
d) The Principles of Catholic Social Teachings
As this brief survey confirms, Christianity offers a rich conception
of the human person as a being whose fundamental interests exceed the
narrow focus of utility maximization. It is the vision of a deeply fragile
being that yearns for meaning and purpose of life and is endowed with
moral dignity that commands respect. It is also that of a social being
whose interest in self-preservation leaves room for the natural feelings of
compassion and sympathy from which the reciprocal recognition of re-
sponsibilities towards others and the principles of justice and fairness
evolve. Human dignity, personhood, and embodiment are the basis upon
which a Christian humanism is built, whose social ethics is comprised of
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four interrelated principles that can also guide our response to the eco-
nomic crisis: human dignity, common good, solidarity, and subsidiarity.
As the II Vatican Council’s Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes (no.
26) points out, “the social order and its development must invariably work
to the benefit of the human person, since the order of things is to be
subordinate to the order of persons, and not the other way around”. While
this social ethics is rooted in scripture and founded on the life and teach-
ings of Jesus, its modern conceptualization began with Pope Leo XIII
and his ground-breaking encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) and it has
been deepened and applied to different aspects of economic life by his
successors.33
The principle of human dignity directs all economic activity to-
wards the common good as its ultimate goal. In its broad sense, the com-
mon good refers to “the sum total of social conditions which allow people,
either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and
more easily”.34  It requires of all institutions of society, including business
and the economy, to serve all members of the human family, to enable
them to meet their basic needs, and to live in dignity. In Mater et Magistra,
John XXIII wrote: If “the whole structure and organisation of an eco-
nomic system is such as to compromise human dignity, to lessen a man’s
sense of responsibility or rob him of opportunity for exercising personal
initiative, then such a system, We maintain, is altogether unjust-no matter
how much wealth it produces, or how justly and equitably such wealth is
distributed” (no. 83).
From the dignity of the human person and its intrinsic social na-
ture are derived the two complementary principles of solidarity and
subsidiarity. As all human persons are equal in dignity and rights, they are
morally obligated to “consider every neighbour without exception as an-
other self” and to accept responsibility for securing the basic conditions
for a life in dignity.35  Solidarity36 is the normative consequence of human
social nature and personal interdependence; it calls everyone to shared
responsibility for the wellbeing of every member of the social community.
“Solidarity helps us to see the ‘other’ __ whether a person, people or
nation __ not just as some kind of instrument, with a work capacity and
physical strength to be exploited at low cost and then discarded when no
longer useful, but as our ‘neighbour’”.37  The principle of solidarity builds
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on the natural sense of compassion and sympathy towards each other but
is not merely a “feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the
misfortunes of so many people”. Instead it is both an authentic moral
virtue grounded in “a firm and persevering determination to commit one-
self to the common good” and a structural moral principle that orders
social life.38
Subsidiarity (subsidium: help) finally flows directly from the rich
conception of human personhood grounded in freedom. As an essentially
moral being, the human person is called to realize her own potential by
fully participating in the life of the community while respecting the dig-
nity and freedom of each member. Subsidiarity seeks to secure this social
space for genuine development of individual freedom and without undue
interference from outside.39
The basic principles of the Catholic social doctrine presuppose
that humans can transcend self-interest and competition into a true com-
munity of people cooperating with each other towards a life of decency
and mutual ethical respect. This vision sets out a framework for Christian
ethics that not only offers resources for confronting the economic and
financial crisis, but that can also be attractive to secular society in its
search for moral orientation. And __ as the rising interest in Christianity in
contemporary China suggests __ it may also be a source of inspiration for
Asian cultures. Specifically, it can be the benchmark for the thorough
overhaul of the economic system that the crisis apparently demands.
4. Towards a Human-Centred Economy
With regard to the normative basis of Christian ethics, it seems
obvious that an adequate response to the economic crisis, with which we
began our considerations, would have to be more than applying some
technical fixes to a system gone astray. In its most recent statement (2011),
the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace refers specifically to taxa-
tion measures on financial transactions, the recapitalization of banks, and
the separation of commercial from investment banking, but also calls for
the education of tomorrow’s leadership in responsibility and commitment
to the common good. While plugging loopholes will be necessary too,
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they will, however, offer only short-term solutions unless we seriously
question some major presuppositions of the underlying economic world
view.
Firstly and above all, we must reject what economist Tim Jackson
has called “the vision of selfinterested hedonism that haunts conventional
economics”. In his analysis, “the utilitarian roots of modern economies
fail to capture the deeper and broader notions of human well-being. The
libertarian focus on individual freedoms misses the broader social nature
of human beings. Institutional structures of the market, the legal forms of
enterprise, the structure of ownership and profit-making have all tended
to focus too narrowly on individual self-interest”.40  Reforming the
economy in accordance with the principles of justice and sustainability
will certainly need staunch efforts on the part of governments and busi-
ness organisations to define new parameters of economic efficiency and
the reduction of unsustainable processes of production. Yet, the changes
must reach deeper and attempt to alter the materialist and consumerist
mentality at the basis of the capitalist system of free market economy.41
Our focus needs to shift from competition to cooperation, from
hoarding money to sharing goods, from materialistic values to spiritual
ones. This will require balancing self-interest with the interests of others,
particularly those who have no voice, neither on the stock exchange, such
as the poor, nor in economic transactions, such as nature with all her
creatures. Although this may sound like fantasy, the nagging suspicion is
spreading that something is inherently wrong with our economic system
and that it is unsustainable both with regard to the unjust distribution of
goods, benefits, and burdens between rich and poor nations and with
regard to its depletion of natural resources and its destructive ecological
and climatological consequences. Drawing on the definition of
sustainability by the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment, numerous indicators suggest that the present economic system com-
promises with accelerating speed “the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs”.42
It is here that the religious vision of a life worth living could be
expected to join forces with government, economists, and concerned citi-
zens in moving the reform forward. Christian ethics reminds us of our
responsibility for God’s creation and for each other in a true sense of
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caring brotherhood. In the meantime, a sense of urgency is growing and
has even extended to economic theory. Questions about the relationship
between economy and spirituality or between the prevailing consumerist
mentality of utility maximization and alternative comprehensive value
orientations are no longer taboo. Representative of such new openness
towards exploring the fundamental presuppositions of our economic sys-
tem is The Palgrave Handbook of Spirituality and Business edited and
published last year (2011) by Luk Bouckaert and Laszlo Zsolnai. In re-
sponse to the growing awareness that managing the vital resources of
mankind will not succeed without its spiritual resources, the handbook
explores the conditions for a transformation towards a post-capitalist,
value-driven global economy.
At the practical level and among the various initiatives, the move-
ment that promotes an Economy of Sharing (EOS) or an Economy of
Communion (EOC) merits attention.43  It originated from the shock Chiara
Lubich, the founder of the Catholic lay movement Focolare, experienced
during her visit in 1991 to Sao Paolo, when she saw all those business
skyscrapers flanked by vast areas of slums. She realized that the chari-
table distribution of goods, as practiced in the Focolare Movement up to
that time, was inadequate in the face of this size of poverty and needed to
be complemented by a new form of business enterprise based on the prin-
ciple of human dignity and with a broad conception of stakeholders at its
centre. This type of business would have to be human-centred and all its
processes directed toward contributing to the common good. Besides
bringing work to the unemployed and sharing the profit with the poor by
enabling them to help themselves, EOS tries to disprove in practice the
traditional presupposition that markets can only function through moti-
vations of self-interest. While this experience may not be universaliseable,
it certainly is a shining example of a viable alternative to the dominant
economic system.44  It holds up the hope that a “decent society” (Avishai
Margalit) is possible where people are no longer humiliated and the prin-
ciples of dignity and justice are firmly established in the economic system.
Secondly, as our consumerist and self-serving mentality is deeply
enmeshed in a materialistic vision of prosperity that deepens the gulf be-
tween the rich and the poor, we need to take a fresh look at economic
value and our traditional concepts of profit, prosperity, and wealth. Rich-
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ard Layard has pointed to the paradox “at the heart of our lives” and
investigated it at great length: “Most people want more income and strive
for it. Yet as Western societies have got richer, their people have become
no happier”.45  Apparently, at the root of this paradox lies confusion about
the means and the ends of economic activity and business. Wealth is more
than profit as the libertarian creed and its “acquisitive spirit” would make
us believe. While profit can be a means of satisfactory human living, by
itself it is not the end of a good life.46  Instead, it can be counterproductive
and destroy the good life, for oneself and for others. As Benedict XVI
writes in Caritas in Veritate, “Once profit becomes the exclusive goal, if
it is produced by improper means and without the common good as its
ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth and creating poverty” (no. 21).47
Therefore the narrow focus on the maximization of shareholder value
and profit has to be substituted by a “richer” conception of wealth that
links it to the satisfaction of basic needs as well as to the enjoyment of
fundamental freedoms and capabilities, and this applies to individuals as
well as to whole nations.
Economically, the wealth of a nation comprises all relevant assets
(private and public) including its natural, financial, human, and “social”
capital.48  A substantial and traditionally much neglected asset is the natu-
ral capital consisting of all non-renewable resources (e.g. oil, natural gas,
coal, and mineral resources), infrastructures, machinery, and urban land,
as well as the “intangible capital”. The latter encompasses the sum of
knowledge, skills, and know-how in the population and in particular its
social capital, which includes the level of trust among people in a society
and their ability to work together for a common goal.49  In short, the
“materialistic vision of prosperity has to be dismantled” and replaced with
a conception that generates “capabilities for flourishing within ecological
limits”.50
The necessary re-orientation towards a comprehensive concep-
tion of human prosperity and flourishing needs to enlist the spiritual re-
sources of mankind. From a Christian perspective, it can draw on its ho-
listic conception of the human person whose goals in life extend beyond
material well-being and strive towards the spiritual union with God and
for human brotherhood. The Christian churches can lead the way to prove
by their action that true wealth consists in a humane society in which
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everyone’s basic needs are met and human capabilities can freely develop.
As Pope Paul VI pointed out in his encyclical Populorum Progressio, the
vision of authentic “brotherhood of man” rests on the three-fold obliga-
tion of mutual solidarity, social justice, and universal charity (no. 44).
The Christian churches can promote investment in public goods and so-
cial infrastructure and thus help build momentum to change the prevail-
ing value perspectives towards a more altruistic and caring society. “When
individuals and communities do not see a rigorous respect for the moral,
cultural and spiritual requirements, based on the dignity of the person and
on the proper identity of each community, beginning with the family and
religious societies, then all the rest __ availability of goods, abundance of
technical resources applied to daily life, a certain level of material well-
being __ will prove unsatisfying and in the end contemptible”.51
Thirdly, the economic crisis has once again put into sharp focus
the question what kind of responsibility, if any, business may have. The
inherent tendency of the prevailing economic system to keep ethics at
arm’s length, has favoured a mentality that saw the only responsibility of
business, be it a small company, a bank, or a large transnational corpora-
tion, to stay “within the rules of the game, which is to say”, to engage “in
open and free competition without deception or fraud”.52  The responsi-
bility of business was only legal and defined by the legal frameworks
within which it has to operate. Any moral or social responsibility it may
be thought to have was regarded as an exclusively private affair of indi-
vidual conscientiousness and discretion.
While Milton Friedman could still believe that using “the cloak of
social responsibility, and the nonsense spoken in its name”, was subver-
sive and would “clearly harm the foun-dations of a free society”,53 in the
midst of the economic crisis we are beginning to realize that it is just the
other way round and that an economy that merely “stays within the rules
of the game” and lacks in responsibility, both moral and social, is a seri-
ous threat to society. Business is not only legally but also morally respon-
sible to respect the laws and regulations and thus to contribute on its part
to the provision of public goods and to refrain from harming societal
well-being. This responsibility is grounded in the principle of human dig-
nity and defined within the framework of basic human rights. In this re-
gard it is crucially important to remember that human rights are above all
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not legal stipulations within the jurisdiction of nation states but inalien-
able moral rights of the family of man. And they are not only claim-rights
but carry also complementary duties that apply to individuals, business,
and states alike. Following Henry Shue’s seminal classification, every ba-
sic right correlates with duties “to avoid depriving”, “to protect from
deprivation”, and “to aid the deprived”.54  In the meantime, this classifica-
tion has been endorsed by the UN and integrated into the human rights
framework with its three core principles to “protect, respect, and rem-
edy” as moral sign posts for “all social actors __ governments, companies,
and civil society”. As the economic crisis has confirmed, the dominant
model of capitalist, free market economy has created “a permissive envi-
ronment” within which blameworthy acts by corporations, especially banks,
could occur “without adequate sanctioning or reparation. For the sake of
the victims of abuse, and to sustain globalization as a positive force, this
must be fixed”.55  Instead of exclusively serving individual gratification
and shareholder value, the economy and specifically the finance industry
must revert to serving the common good as the prime goal of all eco-
nomic activity, and this will include securing the basic rights of everyone.
It seems obvious that for this process of moral re-orientation to
succeed, Christian ethics could provide valuable support. The Catholic
Church’s initial hostility towards the human rights idea56 that saw in it
little more than the attempt to install man as the exclusive measure of all
things has long been rectified. It is now recognized as a tragic misunder-
standing that in fact had the potential to undermine the fundamental prin-
ciple of Christian ethics, human dignity. In the meantime, the Church has
become a strong defender of human rights and time and again reminds
not only the faithful but also government and business of the Christian
foundations of the respect for the inviolable dignity of man and of moral
responsibility for the common good. Thus “the principle of human rights
is of profound concern to the area of social justice and is the measure by
which it can be tested in the life of political bodies”.57
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